## 9001 ways



### itinerary

- refresher on container concepts
- low-level linux stuff for host separation
  - cgroups, namespaces, container runtimes, processes...
- types of container escapes
  - filesystem, memory, kernel, runtime...
- real world examples
  - eBPF linux kernel vulnerability (demo!)
  - supply chain attack
- what can you do to prevent this
  - o selinux, apparmor, seccomp, tap...
- q&a :)



#### refresher on container basics


encapsulating applications and their dependencies into a single package that runs in isolated environments on a shared operating system kernel


- portable
- scalable
- fast
- isolated?



there is **no** container — it's just another process running on your machine







## host separation

- namespaces
- cgroups
- container runtime



## types of container escapes

- filesystem
- memory
- container runtime
- kernel



#### **eBPF**

originally designed for packet filtering but later extended to allow running user-space code directly in the kernel


does to the linux kernel what js does to html (in a sense)



#### eBPF attack vectors

- eBPF verifier
  - trick kernel into loading unsafe bytecode
  - arithmetic/logic errors
- JIT compiler
  - errors in compilation of bytecode
- memory corruption to overwrite eBPF programs





directed acyclic graph (DAG) check to prevent loops and validate the control flow graph (CFG), ensuring there are no unreachable instructions simulates execution of every instruction, examining all possible execution paths to observe how each affects the state of registers and the stack


#### in the wild...

vulnerabilities in the eBPF verifier, which can be exploited for local privilege escalation:

- CVE-2021-3490
- CVE-2023-2163
- CVE-2024-41003



#### maths!



the exploit relies on a flaw in the eBPF verifier's handling of certain arithmetic operations, allowing attackers to manipulate kernel memory and execute arbitrary code

blind spot in the fence: raptors escape if they hit the fence just right




diagram: @chompie1337

# demo:D

#### what now?

testing the fences for weak spots

- explore the network
- data exfiltration, steal credentials/files
- lateral movement, e.g. spawn more (privileged) containers
- establish persistence, install a backdoor
- ransomware
- phishing (mail server/dns)

downloading sensitive info (like dino feeding schedules or electric fence codes)

hidden nest in the visitor center

raptors once they're loose—moving from one paddock to another




## container runtime




#### selinux

mandatory access control prevents runc from being overwritten by malicious containers, even if containers are run as root



#### apparmor

similar to selinux (mac model)
path based instead of policy based




## seccomp (secure computing mode)


kernel feature that restricts the system calls a process can make

ensures that even if a malicious program gets inside a container, it can't easily make a jailbreak by exploiting system calls to interact directly with the host kernel or gain unauthorized access to resources.

## supply chain attacks





## trusted software supply chain



## Further Reading :D

- <u>aquasec.com/cloud-native-academy/container-security/container-security</u>
- redhat.com/en/blog/hardening-docker-containers-images-and-host-security-toolkit
- <u>chomp.ie/Blog+Posts/Kernel+Pwning+with+eBPF+-+a+Love+Story</u>
- <u>bughunters.google.com/blog/6303226026131456/a-deep-dive-into-cve-2023-2163</u>
   <u>-how-we-found-and-fixed-an-ebpf-linux-kernel-vulnerability</u>
- blog.doyensec.com/2022/10/11/ebpf-bypass-security-monitoring.html







# q&a

